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1-CLICK ENERGY: MANAGING CORPORATE
DEMAND FOR CLEAN POWER
GINA S. WARREN ∗
ABSTRACT
Globally, more private businesses, especially Fortune 100 companies are generating their own electricity, investing in renewable
energy facilities, and voluntarily purchasing renewable energy
credits to cover their carbon footprints. This shift could have a
significant impact on the existing energy delivery system. On the
one hand, this shift shows positive momentum toward the incorporation of clean energy into a fossil fuel dominated grid. As the
negative impacts of climate change accelerate around the globe,
decreasing reliance on fossil fuels is certainly an important goal.
On the other hand, corporate disruption of what has historically
been a highly regulated public service industry could result in a
slippery slope of market power and loosened consumer protections, lost profits and stranded costs for utilities, and increased
utility bills for the remaining customers. This Article recommends
changes to the current regulatory scheme that would (1) go further
to protect customers from multinational corporate wholesale
sellers of electricity and (2) allow utilities to plan and collaborate
earlier with large corporate customers to meet their clean energy
demands.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate demand for clean energy skyrocketed in recent years. This
demand for clean energy could very well be the catalyst the renewable energy
industry needs to push it beyond fossil fuels. Unfortunately, public utility
companies are not as nimble as private corporations would like them to be,
and they have not always been able to respond to this increased demand. As
a result, multinational companies, like Apple and Google, are either generating their own energy or entering the energy market themselves.
This shift could have a significant negative impact on the existing energy delivery system and a regulatory framework that is not equipped to deal
with massive, multi-market companies entering the industry. When Thomas
Edison flipped the switch at his Pearl Street station on September 4, 1882,
lighting 400 light bulbs, 1 little could he have known that, one day, technology
would advance so far to allow people to speak to each other from different
parts of the planet. The leaps and bounds made in technology over the last
136 years are just that huge. In the same way that Edison could not have
imagined future technology, state and federal regulatory commissions could
not have anticipated the rapidly emerging new technologies and societal demands presented by multinational corporate entities. This Article discusses

1. LINCOLN L. DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 291 (2015).
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the corporate demand for clean power and recommends how the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and state public utility commissions
can update their regulatory framework to better manage that demand.
Part II of this Article explores the increasing corporate demand for clean
energy and the emergence of private corporations, such as Apple and Google,
onto the energy landscape. In August 2016, Apple Energy LLC (“Apple Energy”) received federal approval to sell wholesale electricity into the national
grid. 2 Prior to that, Google Energy received approval to do the same. 3 Globally, we see more private businesses, especially Fortune 100 companies, generating their own electricity, investing in renewable energy facilities, and voluntarily purchasing renewable energy credits to cover their carbon footprint.
While multiple reasons likely factored into the shift toward self-generation, one reason may be that utilities are unable to supply the amount of
renewable energy now in demand, leaving corporations to come up with creative means to meet their corporate social responsibility goals and the market
demands of millennials who are seeking sustainable products. Regardless of
the reasons, the energy delivery landscape will change significantly as more
and more businesses self-generate. This change can be positive, as it adds
much needed renewable energy. The concern, however, is the private disruption of what has historically been a highly regulated public service industry, potentially resulting in a slippery slope of market power and a potential
lack of consumer protection.
As large multinational corporations, like Apple and Google, seek to sell
electricity, FERC, the agency in charge of regulating wholesale energy sales,
will need to implement more protective measures to ensure consumers are
charged reasonable and nondiscriminatory rates for electricity and energy
products. Part III explains FERC’s current rule, which allows multinational
corporations to use market-based rates in setting customer rates for electricity
or energy products, so long as they do not own or control (that is, so long as
they do not have market power) over a certain amount of electricity within
any given region. This is called the “horizontal market power rule.” Further,
Part III recommends FERC redefine market power to include market power
in any industry, not just in industries regulated by FERC. 4 FERC has the
exclusive authority to regulate wholesale sales of electricity and an obligation
to ensure that customers are protected and not manipulated by those sales. 5
2. Aaron Pressman, Solar Power from Apple Could Light Up Your Home, FORTUNE (Aug. 4,
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/08/04/apple-approval-solar-electricity/.
3. See Candace Lombardi, Google Gets Go-Ahead to Buy, Sell Energy, CNET (Feb. 19, 2010,
6:38 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/google-gets-go-ahead-to-buy-sell-energy/.
4. FERC’s regulatory authority generally includes hydropower, wholesale electricity generation, liquified natural gas projects, and interstate transmission of electricity, natural gas, and oil. See
What FERC Does, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.asp (last updated Aug. 14, 2018).
5. Id.
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It may establish whatever rule is appropriate to effectuate this congressional
mandate. Recent case law affirms that in fulfilling its statutory obligations,
FERC should also consider relevant factors that are outside of its regulatory
control, such as whether the applicant holds market power in another industry
it could use to manipulate and discriminate against energy customers. 6
Part IV discusses the stress corporate demand for, or independent development of, clean energy places on existing retail regulatory frameworks. If
large corporate customers leave, utilities could be left with lost profits and
stranded costs, which could then be filtered down to the remaining customers,
resulting in higher utility bills for everyone. However, this also provides an
opportunity for regulators to change how utilities plan and collaborate with
their customers, so that they can be responsive to clean energy demands.
As the negative impacts of climate change accelerate around the globe, 7
the goal of decreasing reliance on fossil fuels is certainly an important one.
Part V concludes that the corporate demand for clean energy could very well
be the catalyst that propels clean energy into the spotlight. Large multinational corporations have the means and motive to ensure their products are
offered through an environmentally friendly, clean energy manner. This is
the future with customers, shareholders, and investors demanding no less.
The goal, however, is to do so in a way that protects the end consumer from
unreasonable costs associated with either market manipulation or utility lost
profits.
II. THE CORPORATE DEMAND FOR CLEAN ENERGY
This Part analyzes the ever-increasing corporate demand for clean energy and some of the drivers for this demand, including consumer and investor expectations. 8 This Part also discusses how this corporate demand is outpacing utility supply and how corporations are acting to generate their own
renewable energy outside of the historical utility supply structure. 9
A. Corporate Renewable Energy Goals and Incentives
Influential global companies are increasingly demanding access to clean
energy. According to one report, 23% of new wind capacity in the United
States is built for non-utility, private businesses. 10 In 2015 alone, over 300
6. See Sierra Club v. FERC (Southeast Market Pipelines Project), 867 F.3d 1357, 1376 (D.C.
Cir. 2017).
7. See Alina Bradford & Stephanie Pappas, Effects of Global Warming, LIVE SCI. (Aug. 12,
2017, 9:12 AM), https://www.livescience.com/37057-global-warming-effects.html.
8. See infra Section II.A.
9. See infra Section II.B.
10. LeRoy C. Paddock & Max Greenblum, Community Benefit Agreements for Wind Farm
Siting in Context, in SHARING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ENERGY AND RESOURCE ACTIVITY:
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billion euros were globally invested in clean energy, 11 and as of the writing
of this Article, corporate buyers have purchased some 19 gigawatts (“GW”) 12
of renewable energy. 13 While multiple reasons can contribute to this shift,
observable trends are those within large multinational corporations that have
established corporate social responsibility initiatives to meet consumer and
investor expectations.
Voluntary corporate social responsibility initiatives 14 appear to be playing a big role in increasing private generation (and consumption) of renewable energy, with major companies seeing an economic advantage to taking
on more leadership roles for climate control measures. According to one
study, 60% of Fortune 100 companies and 43% of Fortune 500 companies
have some sort of green energy goals or initiatives. 15 For example, Apple,
Bloomberg, Coca-Cola Enterprises, Equinix, GM, Goldman Sachs, Google,
H&M, HP Inc., IKEA, ING, Johnson&Johnson, Microsoft, 16 Nestle, Nike,

LEGAL CHANGE AND IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES 155, 156 (Lila Barrera-Hernández et al. eds., 2016)
(citing Emily Williams, Top Trends for Wind Power in 2014, INTO THE WIND (Apr. 15, 2015),
http://www.aweablog.org/ten-top-trends-for-wind-power-in-2014/).
11. Commission Proposes New Rules for Consumer Centred Clean Energy Transition,
EUROPEAN COMM’N (Nov. 30, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/commission-proposesnew-rules-consumer-centred-clean-energy-transition.
12. How much power is 1 gigawatt? According to the U.S. Department of Energy, it is enough
to power Doc’s DeLorean from Back to the Future or 100 million LED lights (light-emitting diodes)
or 9,090 Nissan Leafs. See How Much Power Is 1 Gigawatt?, OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY &
RENEWABLE ENERGY (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.energy.gov/eere/articles/how-much-power-1gigawatt.
13. Angus McCrone, McCrone: Companies Buying Green Power–How Big a Trend?,
BLOOMBERG NEF (Apr. 20, 2017), https://about.bnef.com/blog/companies-buying-green-powerbig-trend/.
14. Corporate social responsibility can be defined in many ways, but the 3P business model
encourages social responsibility initiatives that focus on “people, planet and profit.” Arlette
Measures, What Is a 3P Triple Bottom Line Company?, HOUS. CHRON, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/3p-triple-bottom-line-company-4141.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).
15. WORLD WILDLIFE FOUND. ET AL., POWER FORWARD 2.0: HOW AMERICAN COMPANIES
ARE SETTING CLEAN ENERGY TARGETS AND CAPTURING GREATER BUSINESS VALUE 9 (2014),
https://www.ceres.org/sites/default/files/reports/2017-05/PowerForward2.0.pdf;
see
RE100,
GROWING MARKET DEMAND FOR RENEWABLE POWER: RE100 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2016),
http://media.virbcdn.com/files/f9/d6e716c56a9b3312-RE100AnnualReport2016_v17.pdf (“There
are now an increasing number of companies, investors, cities and citizens that have set renewable
power targets and this is driving change in the market place. Electricity utilities and policymakers
now need to consider the source of electricity that is wanted—not just the quantity, location or
timing.”).
16. Microsoft is also currently partnering with the University of Texas to research means for
their data centers to become battery-powered. Kristen Mosbrucker, Electricity Gap: Microsoft Taps
UTSA, Energy Companies to Bridge Data-Center Divide, SAN ANTONIO BUS. J. (Aug. 12, 2016),
https://www.bizjournals.com/sanantonio/news/2016/08/11/electricity-gap-microsoft-taps-utsa-energy.html.
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Philips, SAP, Starbucks, TD Bank Group, UBS, and Walmart 17 have voluntary corporate social responsibility initiatives committed to only using renewable electricity for business activities and increasing the demand and access
to renewable energy around the globe. 18 Many of these corporations have
also joined RE100, 19 a collaborative of businesses committed to a sustainable
future through renewable electricity. 20 While they each have varying goals,
these companies all made commitments to become 100% renewable by a certain date. 21 Some companies already reached the 100% renewable energy
goal; however, the average RE100 company is only about 50% of the way
there. Average RE100 companies are projected to reach 80% by 2020. 22
Companies with corporate initiatives to consume their energy and electricity from renewable sources cite several reasons for this target, including:
• To reduce their carbon footprint—in some cases, companies have specifically set science-based targets to map
their greenhouse gas emissions reductions, and switching
to renewable energy is part of that strategy[;]
• To secure stable energy bills and mitigate fluctuating or
uncertain medium to long-term energy costs[;]
• To realize cost savings associated with generating power
from renewables—particularly wind and solar[;]
• To gain cost benefits of onsite combined heat and power
plants—particularly where there is a low or no-cost waste
or biomass feedstock[; 23and]

17. See Companies, RE100, http://there100.org/companies (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
18. RE100, supra note 15, at 2–4; see RE100, supra note 17.
19. See RE100, supra note 17.
20. RE100, supra note 15, at 2–3. “The private sector accounts for around half of the world’s
electricity consumption. Switching this demand to renewables will accelerate the transformation of
the global energy market and aid the transition to a low carbon economy.” The World’s Most Influential Companies, Committed to 100% Renewable Power, RE100, http://there100.org/re100 (last
visited Feb. 15, 2018).
21. RE100, supra note 15, at 4. Companies are also looking to encourage their supply chain
to incorporate renewable energy directives. Id. at 6.
22. Id. at 12–15. Businesses from all sectors have shown an interest in renewable energy consumption/generation; however, the information communications and technology sector is leading
the way. The businesses in this sector are nearly two-thirds of the way to meeting their goals. Id.
at 5. For example, “Apple, Facebook, Google and Microsoft . . . have all built ultra-efficient data
[centers] powered with renewable energy to green their images.” Stephen Lacey, Why Big Data Is
Going Green, CORP. KNIGHTS (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.corporateknights.com/channels/connected-planet/why-big-data-is-going-green-13970577/. This is not surprising given the significant
amount of energy required for data centers and cloud computing, as well as their corporate brands
promoting sustainability. RE100, supra note 15, at 7.
23. “A feedstock is defined as any renewable, biological material that can be used directly as
a fuel, or converted to another form of fuel or energy product. Biomass feedstocks are the plant and
algal materials used to derive fuels like ethanol, butanol, biodiesel, and other hydrocarbon fuels.”
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•

To access a more reliable electricity supply in areas where
there is no or intermittent grid electricity. 24
In addition to these reasons, however, studies show that a major driver
for corporate renewable energy initiatives is customer and investor expectation. An overwhelming percentage of customers (some 80%) believe corporations should engage in social initiatives and those initiatives would be financially beneficial for the corporation. 25 Multiple social science studies
show a link between corporate social initiatives and positive consumer response with improved financial performance. 26 The most effective initiatives, however, are those that closely parallel the firm’s brand and image. 27
Customers expect corporations to engage in sincere social responsibility and
will punish those perceived to be insincere, reactive, or acting only in their
self-interest. 28 Customers may also punish corporations who stay silent or
fail to act when customers have an expectation (based on image and brand)
that the corporation will act. 29 This appears to be particularly true when it
comes to millennials.
According to a 2015 market study conducted by Morgan Stanley, millennials—and especially female millennials—care significantly more about
sustainability than their predecessors. 30 With a whopping 84% of the millennial investors identifying sustainability as an important factor when making
living and investment decisions, 31 businesses like Apple and Google are taking notice. 32 According to the report, millennials—as compared to the general population—are:
• Nearly three times more likely to seek employment with a
company because of its stance on social and/or environmental issues . . . [;]

Biomass Feedstocks, OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/eere/bioenergy/biomass-feedstocks#Top (last visited Aug. 21, 2018).
24. RE100, supra note 15, at 4.
25. Karen L. Becker-Olsen et al., The Impact of Perceived Corporate Social Responsibility on
Consumer Behavior, 59 J. BUS. RES. 46, 52 (2006).
26. Id. at 47 (citing numerous studies).
27. Id. at 49.
28. Id. at 46.
29. Daniel Korschun, Staying Politically Neutral Is More Dangerous for Companies than You
Think, CONVERSATION (Feb. 5, 2017, 11:56 PM), http://theconversation.com/staying-politicallyneutral-is-more-dangerous-for-companies-than-you-think-72252.
30. MORGAN STANLEY INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE INVESTING, SUSTAINABLE SIGNALS: THE
INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE 1 (2015) [hereinafter MORGAN STANLEY], https://www.morganstanley.com/sustainableinvesting/pdf/Sustainable_Signals.pdf. Interestingly, women investors
are “substantially more likely” than men investors to care about sustainability when making investment decisions. Id.
31. Id. at 4.
32. Pressman, supra note 2; see Candace, supra note 3.
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•

Nearly twice as likely to purchase from a brand because of
the company’s social and/or environmental impact . . . [;]
• Nearly twice as likely to check product packaging to ensure sustainability . . . [;]
• Nearly twice as likely to invest in companies or funds that
target specific social or environmental outcomes . . . [;]
• Nearly twice as likely to invest in companies or funds that
aim to use environmental, social, or governance practices
to create a value differentiator . . . [; and]
• Over twice as likely to exit an investment position because
of objectionable corporate activity . . . . 33
By 2020, one-third of the United States’ adult population will be comprised of millennials, 34 who are projected to spend $1.4 trillion annually. 35
This is important when reconciled with another study that found, globally,
nearly three in four millennials are willing to pay more for sustainable products and services. 36 Millennials are looking for fresh organic ingredients,
environmentally friendly services, and companies who share their commitment to social values. 37 They are image-conscious with their work and personal life, and they are willing to sacrifice or pay more to be associated with
a company who represents their ideals. 38 Furthermore, millennials are more
electronically aware and connected than any previous generation. They are
heavy users of technology, portable devices, and social media and are greatly
influenced by those interactions. 39 Prudent companies, aware of these market
preferences, will compete for their business and look to accommodate these
consumer, investor, and work preferences. 40 Electricity generation provides
a good example of this shifting landscape. One article title summed it up
33. MORGAN STANLEY, supra note 30, at 4.
34. Id.
35. CHRISTOPHER DONNELLY & RENATO SCAFF, ACCENTURE, WHO ARE THE MILLENNIAL
SHOPPERS? AND WHAT DO THEY REALLY WANT?, https://www.accenture.com/mz-en/insight-outlook-who-are-millennial-shoppers-what-do-they-really-want-retail (last visited Sept. 15, 2018).
36. Green Generation: Millennials Say Sustainability Is a Shopping Priority, NIELSEN (Nov.
5, 2015), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2015/green-generation-millennials-say-sustainability-is-a-shopping-priority.html.
37. The Sustainability Imperative, NIELSEN (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/reports/2015/the-sustainability-imperative.html.
38. CHRISTINE BARTON ET AL., BCG, HOW MILLENNIALS ARE CHANGING THE FACE OF
MARKETING FOREVER (2014), https://www.bcg.com/publications/2014/marketing-center-consumer-customer-insight-how-millennials-changing-marketing-forever.aspx.
39. Id. “Millennials identify with brands more personally and emotionally than do older generations. Fifty percent of U.S. [m]illennials ages 18 to 24 and 38[%] of those ages 25 to 34 agree
that brands ‘say something about who I am, my values, and where I fit in.’” Id.
40. MORGAN STANLEY, supra note 30, at 4 (“As [m]illennials begin to accumulate more
wealth and invest accordingly, their perceptions of sustainability are likely to have a significant
impact on the financial services sector.”).
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quite well: “Millennials want solar, storage, shared energy—and an app for
all that.” 41
B. The Shift to Corporate Generation of Renewable Energy
The challenge for corporations is finding a way to fulfill their renewable
energy goals and satisfy consumer and investor expectations. Their options
include purchasing utility-scale renewable energy, purchasing renewable energy credits or certificates, 42 entering into power purchase agreements
(“PPAs”) 43 for wind, solar, and hydropower, or installing their own renewable energy generating facilities (self-generation). 44 As discussed in great detail in Part IV, most companies prefer to purchase their renewable energy
directly from their local utility company; however, utilities are unable to meet
the increased demand. 45 So, while corporations do not want to enter into
PPAs or self-generate, “the lack of responsiveness from utilities in some regions has forced them to do exactly this,” and unless the power sector can
find “more proactive and creative solutions,” it may be the wave of the future. 46

41. Sophie Vorrath, Millennials Want Solar, Storage, Shared Energy—And an App for All
That, ONE STEP OFF THE GRID (Aug. 17, 2016), https://onestepoffthegrid.com.au/millennials-wantsolar-storage-shared-energy-app/. According to this study, millennials expect renewable energy
consumption and an application to control their energy profiles that allows for sharing opportunities.
Id. Globally, over half of all millennials said they would invest in their own renewable energy, such
as solar panels, in the next five years; and of them, 73% wanted to share any excess power with
other consumers and 77% would use onsite battery storage. Id. This interest in battery energy
storage is related to millennials’ desire to be portable. Historically, home energy delivery management was developed for homeowners. Millennials, however, are less likely and less interested in
owning homes. Instead, they want to be in control of their energy consumption on an individual
basis. See Bruce Eric Anderson, Honeywell Introduces Home Energy Management Software for
Utilities to Enhance Grid Stability, Help Homeowners Lower Energy Bills, HONEYWELL (Jan. 31,
2017), https://www.honeywell.com/newsroom/pressreleases/2017/01/honeywell-introduces-homeenergy-management-software-for-utilities-to-enhance-grid-stability-help-homeowners-lower-energy-bills.
42. One renewable energy credit (or certificate) generally represents 1 megawatt hour
(“MWh”) of electricity generated by a renewable energy source. See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 1,
at 485–86. While anyone can purchase a renewable energy credit (generally to offset the amount of
energy consumed), renewable energy credits were historically used by a utility company to meet
state renewable energy requirements, instead of actually generating the renewable energy itself. See
id.
43. A PPA is a long-term financial agreement between two parties, one which generates electricity (the seller) and one which is looking to purchase electricity (the buyer) to assist in financing
the energy project.
See Power Purchase Agreements, RENEWABLE CHOICE ENERGY,
https://www.renewablechoice.com/services/power-purchase-agreements/ (last visited Aug. 21,
2018).
44. RE100, supra note 15, at 12–15.
45. Id. at 7.
46. Id.
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Further, purchasing renewable energy credits has fallen out of favor because it does not guarantee that renewable energy is displacing fossil fuel
energy, only that a credit is being purchased. Forbes ran an article, in June
2016, outlining Apple’s history and what may have played into its decision
to join the energy business. 47 According to the article, Apple was one of the
first of the world’s largest companies to commit to 100% renewable energy. 48
Apple already claims 93% of its global energy consumption comes from renewable resources. 49 One way Apple achieved 93% is by purchasing renewable energy credits or certificates. 50 The article points out, however, “a company cannot claim to be 100% renewable while relying entirely on grid
power,” especially in the United States where two-thirds of the grid is still
powered by fossil fuels. 51 Most companies dedicated to green energy see
purchasing offsets as a short-term band-aid. They see it as a bridge to meet
their targets until they can implement more permanent solutions like PPAs
and on-site renewable energy generation. 52
As a result, many companies have entered into PPAs with independent
power producers to secure their renewable power. 53 For example, Microsoft
signed two PPAs for wind energy in Texas that generate up to 100 megawatts
(“MW”) annually; 54 and Adobe, which has a goal of 100% renewable energy

47. Tim Healy, Why Apple Energy is a Wake-Up Call for Businesses, FORBES (June 16, 2016),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/2016/06/16/why-apple-energy-is-a-wake-up-call-forbusinesses/#6f799a4a3b7d.
48. Id.
49. APPLE, ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT: 2016 PROGRESS REPORT, COVERING
FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 9 (2016), http://images.apple.com/environment/pdf/Apple_Environmental_Responsibility_Report_2016.pdf.
50. Id. at 12. Apple is not alone in this claim. SAP (a German company) claims offset of its
entire global energy use by purchasing renewable energy certificates. Ucilia Wang, SAP Joins Tech
Giants Google and Apple in Reaching for 100% Green Energy, GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/sap-renewable-energy-credits-100-percentgoal.
51. Healy, supra note 47. While Tim Healy, the article’s author and the CEO and chairman of
EnerNOC, defended Apple’s (and others’) historical reliance on renewable energy credits, he discussed the implications of Apple’s move from purchaser to seller, which could be significant. One
potential implication is Apple will look to green up its supply chain by allowing its suppliers to
utilize the on-site renewable energy. Id. The RE100 report signaled this move as well. Companies
are looking to encourage their supply chain to incorporate renewable energy directives. RE100,
supra note 15, at 6. Absent a change in the current regulatory structure, however, companies are
not allowed to sell retail electricity to their suppliers. See THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICITY NEW
TECHNOLOGIES TRANSFORMING THE GRID EDGE, WORLD ECON. FORUM 5 (2017),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Electricity_2017.pdf.
52. RE100, supra note 15, at 7.
53. Id.
54. To put this into context, the average U.S. residential customer consumes approximately 10
to 11 MW of electricity per year (note that 10 MW equals 10,000 kilowatts). Frequently Asked
Question—How Much Electricity Does an American Home Use?, U.S ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
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by 2035, is currently at 30% by using PPAs that feed into the grid. 55 Nearly
half of the RE100 member companies, however, are using some form of onsite self-generation. 56 For example, Infosys (an Indian company) installed
solar panels on its campuses that currently generate approximately 3 MW of
energy, with plans to install another 175 MW through on-site and off-site
installations. 57
Apple and Google also self-generate significant amounts of renewable
energy both on-site and off-site for their own consumption; however, these
two multinational corporations have taken matters one step further and are
now selling their self-generated electricity into the energy market. On June
6, 2016, Apple Energy filed an application with FERC to be a wholesale
seller of electricity with market-based rates. 58 It sought authority to sell electricity in the majority of the U.S. Power Pool Regions 59 beginning in August
2016. 60 Apple Energy is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the tech giant Apple
Inc. (“Apple”). 61 While Apple Energy does not own or control transmission
facilities in any region, Apple owns several generation facilities throughout
the United States, including 267 MW of solar photovoltaic panels, 18 MW

https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=97&t=3 (last updated Nov. 7, 2017); see Electricity Explained: Measuring Electricity, U.S ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.php?page=electricity_measuring (describing how electricity is measured) (last updated Feb. 10, 2017).
55. RE100, supra note 15, at 12.
56. Id. at 12–15.
57. Id. at 13.
58. Application of Apple Energy LLC for Market-Based Rate Authority and Request for Waivers and Blanket Authorizations at 1, No. ER16-1887 (FERC June 6, 2016) [hereinafter Apple Energy Application].
59. See Electric Power Markets: National Overview, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N
(FERC), https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/overview.asp (last update Apr. 13,
2017) (illustrating the U.S. Power Pool Regions).
60. “Applicant seeks authority to sell power at wholesale in the Southeast, Southwest, Northwest, Northeast, Central, and Southwest Power Pool Regions.” Apple Energy Application, supra
note 58, at 1; see also Letter Order Granting Market-Based Rate Authorization at 1 n.1, No. ER161887 (FERC Aug. 4, 2016) [hereinafter FERC Letter Order] (“Apple Energy requests authorization
to sell ancillary services in the markets administered by PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., New York
Independent System Operator, Inc., ISO New England Inc., California Independent System Operator Corp. (CAISO), Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., and Southwest Power Pool,
Inc. Apple Energy also requests authorization to engage in the sale of certain ancillary services as
a third-party provider in other markets.”); Electric Power Markets, supra note 59.
61. Apple Energy Application, supra note 60, at 2.
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of fuel cells, and 3.3 MW of hydropower. 62 Multiple facilities went into service in 2015 or 2016, 63 with a total generating capacity of 288.7 MW in the
United States. 64 Globally, Apple has significantly more generation, including 32 MW at their Singapore facilities that cover more than 800 rooftops 65
and 200 MW at their facilities in China 66 to offset the energy use. Based on
the information provided by Apple Energy and a lack of opposition, 67 FERC
issued a final order 68 granting the application on August 4, 2016. 69 Apple
Energy filed their tariff, and the entity may now sell wholesale power at market-based rates.
62. Apple owns several different generation facilities throughout the United States and abroad,
including:
•
67.5 MW solar photovoltaic and biogas generation facility in North Carolina;
•
3 MW hydroelectric power facility in Oregon (45 Mile Hydroelectric Power
Plant);
•
0.3 MW hydroelectric power facility in Oregon (Monroe Drop Project);
•
19.9 MW solar photovoltaic generating facility in Nevada (Ft. Churchill Solar
Array) (Sierra Pacific Power Company controls and operates this facility,
which is interconnected to the transmission system);
•
50 MW solar photovoltaic generating facility in Arizona (Bonnybrooke PV)
(this facility was still in construction at the time of Apple’s application, is expected to be up and running by the end of 2016, and will be interconnected to
the transmission system);
•
130 MW solar photovoltaic generating facility in California (California Flats
Solar) (this facility was set to begin generation in October 2016, and is governed by a Power Purchase Agreement between Apple and California Flats
Solar);
•
18 MW behind the meter generating facilities (Apple Campus 2—PV and Apple Campus 2—Fuel Cell);
•
32 MW solar rooftops in Singapore; and
•
200 MW solar in China.
See id. at 2–3.
The first three facilities are qualifying facilities, exempt from certain requirements of the Federal Power Act. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.601 (2018). The remaining generation facilities make up 19.9
MW of generation in the Northwest region and 198 MW in the Southwest region. See Apple Energy
Application, supra note 58, at 2–3.
63. Apple Energy Application, supra note 58, at 16–17.
64. See id. at 2–3. The 288.7 MW capacity is less than the 500 MW limit FERC places on
wholesale sellers wishing to use market-based rates. 18 C.F.R. § 35.36(a)(2) (2018).
65. Press Release, Apple, Apple Now Globally Powered by 100 Percent Renewable Energy
(Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2018/04/apple-now-globally-powered-by-100percent-renewable-energy/.
66. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, How Big Is Apple’s Green Initiative in China?, FORTUNE (Oct. 22,
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/10/22/apple-china-solar/.
67. The Public Utilities Commission of Nevada filed a timely notice of intervention but did
not make any additional filings in opposition to Apple Energy’s application. Notice of Intervention
of the Public Utilities Commission of Nevada, No. ER16-1887 (FERC June 22, 2016). No other
interested stakeholders sought to intervene.
68. FERC Letter Order, supra note 59, at 5.
69. Id.
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Several years earlier, Google Energy LLC (“Google Energy”), 70 a
wholly owned subsidiary of Google, Inc. (“Google”), became a wholesale
seller of electricity. 71 At the time of its application, Google did not own any
transmission lines or have market power of any kind because it did not own
any generation facilities in North America. 72 It did, however, request authorization to be a wholesale seller (at market rates) to multiple U.S. regions. 73
It appears Google’s only change in status is it now controls 114 MW of energy generation capacity from a wind farm in Iowa pursuant to a PPA with
Garden Wind. 74
As discussed in Parts III and IV, this shift from utility-based to corporate-based energy generation is disrupting the historical regulatory model for
electricity generation and sales. While this can be seen as a positive change
because it results in an influx of clean energy, this private corporate displacement of what has historically been a highly regulated public utility service
industry could result, among other things, in a slippery slope of corporate
market power and lack of consumer protection.
III. THE CURRENT WHOLESALE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IS NOT
EQUIPPED TO ADDRESS CORPORATE “UTILITIES”
As Apple and Google move into the wholesale electricity market, one
cannot help but consider what this could mean for the future of energy delivery in the United States. This Part looks at the current regulatory framework
and considers the areas in which it may not be adequate to govern situations
where multinational corporations are becoming bigger players. 75 This Part
then suggests FERC should change its test for market power to address the
potential slippery slope early. 76

70. According to the company, Google Energy “was formed to identify and develop opportunities to contain and manage the cost of energy for Google.” Application of Google Energy LLC
for Market Based Rate Authority and Granting of Waivers and Blanket Authorizations at 2, No.
ER10-468 (FERC Dec. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Google Energy Application].
71. Order Granting Market-Based Rate Authorization at 2, No. ER10-468 (FERC Feb. 18,
2010) [hereinafter Google Energy Order].
72. Google Energy Application, supra note 70, at 4.
73. Id. at attach. A. Google requested approval to sell in regions served by PJM Interconnection, New York ISO, New England ISO, California ISO, Midwest ISO, and third parties. Id.
74. Notice of Change in Status, Google Energy LLC, No. ER10-468 (FERC Aug. 13, 2010).
In the notice, Google Energy also acknowledged that it “indirectly holds a 20.5% non-managing
interest in Peace Garden Wind, LLC,” which owns and operates 169.5 MW of wind generation. Id.
at 2 n.5.
75. See infra Section III.A.
76. See infra Section III.B.
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A. The FERC’s Authority over Wholesale Sales of Electricity
FERC has authority to regulate, among other things, entities engaged in
the wholesale generation of electricity and interstate electricity transmission. 77 Wholesale generation refers to the sale of electricity to another entity—usually a utility company—that then distributes the electricity to the
end consumer (the retail sale).78 The Federal Rules require anyone seeking
to become a seller of wholesale power to apply through FERC. 79
Historically, all entities seeking to sell electricity at wholesale were required to submit cost-of-service rate cases for FERC approval. Meaning,
wholesale sellers were required to show their actual costs of service, which
FERC allowed them to recover from the customer, plus a reasonable rate of
return. 80 The utility had the burden to show their investments were prudent
and resulted in a benefit to the customer. 81 As the United States moved toward deregulation of the electricity industry, FERC began reviewing proposals from wholesale power suppliers to use market-based rates—at least on
a case-by-case basis. 82 Market-based rates are intended to be set by a competitive market without industry manipulation. 83 “Regulation of marketbased rates thus focuses not on the costs that firms have actually incurred,
but rather, on the firm’s share of ownership in the market.” 84
FERC’s original test to determine whether a wholesale seller qualified
for market-based rates was a four-pronged analysis:
(1) whether the seller and its affiliates lack, or have adequately mitigated, market power in generation; (2) whether the seller and its
affiliates lack, or have adequately mitigated, market power in
transmission; (3) whether the seller or its affiliates can erect other
barriers to entry; and (4) whether there is evidence involving the
seller or its affiliates that relates to affiliate abuse or reciprocal
dealing. 85

77. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012).
78. Id. § 824(d). “Sale of electric energy at wholesale” is defined as “a sale of electric energy
to any person for resale.” Id.
79. 18 C.F.R. § 35.36(a)(1) (2018) (“Seller means any person that has authorization to or seeks
authorization to engage in sales for resale of electric energy, capacity or ancillary services at marketbased rates under [S]ection 205 of the Federal Power Act.”).
80. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 1, at 368–71, 398–99.
81. Id.
82. Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, 119 FERC ¶ 61,295, 18 C.F.R. Pt. 35, at 5–6 (June 21, 2007) [hereinafter
FERC Order No. 697], https://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2007/062107/E-1.pdf.
83. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 1, at 399.
84. Id.
85. FERC Order No. 697, supra note 82, at 5–6.
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In 2004, FERC began modifying this test and ultimately ended up
streamlining it into the current three-prong test, which requires FERC to determine whether the applicant has: (1) horizontal market power; 86 (2) vertical
market power; 87 or (3) affiliate 88 abuse/preference. 89 In Order 697, FERC
explained that this new test would “help customers by ensuring that they are
protected from the exercise of market power and would also provide greater
certainty to sellers seeking market-based rate authority.” 90
In practice, FERC generally focuses on the first prong, assuming the last
two prongs are met 91 through transmission unbundling 92 and regulatory restructuring. 93 The first prong simply looks at whether the applicant is “a
wholesale power marketer that controls or is affiliated with 500 MW or less
of generation in aggregate per region or a wholesale power producer that
owns, controls or is affiliated with 500 MW or less of generation in aggregate
in the same region as its generation assets.” 94
The Code of Federal Regulations divides wholesale sellers into two categories—Category 1 and Category 2. The distinction lies in the amount of
market power and vertical utility control an applicant has. If the applicant
qualifies as a Category 1 seller, it may sell its electricity at market-based rates
86. Horizontal market power refers to the amount of control a company has over market prices.
See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 1, at 413.
87. Vertical market power refers to the amount of control a company has over upstream or
downstream markets. See id.
88. Affiliate abuse/preference refers to the ability of a company to gain preferential treatment
(and rates) from its affiliates so that the company pays less for the product than does its competitors.
See id. at 413–14.
89. FERC Order No. 697, supra note 82, at 6.
The Commission initiated the instant rulemaking proceeding in April 2004 to consider
‘the adequacy of the current analysis and whether and how it should be modified to assure
that prices for electric power being sold under market-based rates are just and reasonable
under the Federal Power Act.’
Id. (quoting Market-Based Rates for Public Utilities, 107 FERC ¶ 61,019 at 1 (2004)).
90. Id. at 7.
91. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 1, at 414.
92. See Order No. 888, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080 (Apr. 24, 1996) [hereinafter FERC Order 888],
https://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/rm95-8-00w.txt. Historically, utilities were vertically integrated, meaning they owned all of the energy and energy systems so they could generate
energy, transport it on their private transmission lines, and distribute it to the end consumer without
ever involving another entity. Unbundling refers to FERC’s requirement that utilities provide separate tariffs for transmission services and offer open access of transmission facilities to other energy
providers at non-discriminatory rates. See generally Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC,
373 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (discussing how the unbundling of transmission services functions).
93. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.39(a) (2018) (“As a condition of obtaining and retaining market-based
rate authority, the conditions provided in this [S]ection, including the restriction on affiliate sales of
electric energy and all other affiliate provisions, must be satisfied on an ongoing basis, unless otherwise authorized by Commission rule or order. Failure to satisfy these conditions will constitute a
violation of the Seller’s market-based rate tariff.”).
94. Id. § 35.36(a)(2)(i).
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instead of requiring cost-of-service ratemaking. 95 To qualify for Category 1
status, the applicant must not have market power. It must not own—or be
affiliated with 96—more than 500 MW of power generation within any certain
region. In addition, the applicant must not own, operate, or control transmission facilities or be affiliated with anyone who does. 97 These requirements
are ongoing and not just applicable at the time of filing. 98 A seller must report
any change in status to the FERC within thirty days. 99
In contrast, a Category 2 Seller is one that does not fit within the parameters of Category 1, meaning the applicant either owns greater than 500 MW

95. Frequently Asked Questions: Market-Based Rates, FERC, https://www.ferc.gov/resources/faqs/mbr-faqs.asp (last updated Mar. 21, 2018). “Cost-of-service rates try to replicate the
outcome a competitive market would produce, by examining utilities’ costs, whether those costs
were prudently accrued, how they benefit customers, and then allowing the company to earn a ‘reasonable’ return on its investment.” DAVIES ET AL., supra note 1, at 398.
96. Affiliate of a specified company means:
(i) Any person that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 10
percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the specified company;
(ii) Any company 10 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are owned,
controlled, or held with power to vote, directly or indirectly, by the specified company;
(iii) Any person or class of persons that the Commission determines, after appropriate
notice and opportunity for hearing, to stand in such relation to the specified company that
there is liable to be an absence of arm’s-length bargaining in transactions between them
as to make it necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or consumers that the person be treated as an affiliate; and
(iv) Any person that is under common control with the specified company.
(v) For purposes of paragraph (a)(9), owning, controlling or holding with power to vote,
less than 10 percent of the outstanding voting securities of a specified company creates a
rebuttable presumption of lack of control.
18 C.F.R. § 35.36(a)(9) (2018).
97. The Code of Federal Regulations defines a Category 1 Seller as a Seller that:
(i) Is either a wholesale power marketer that controls or is affiliated with 500 MW or less
of generation in aggregate per region or a wholesale power producer that owns, controls
or is affiliated with 500 MW or less of generation in aggregate in the same region as its
generation assets;
(ii) Does not own, operate or control transmission facilities other than limited equipment
necessary to connect individual generating facilities to the transmission grid . . . ;
(iii) Is not affiliated with anyone that owns, operates or controls transmission facilities in
the same region as the Seller’s generation assets;
(iv) Is not affiliated with a franchised public utility in the same region as the Seller’s
generation assets; and
(v) Does not raise other vertical market power issues.
Id. § 35.36(a)(2).
98. Id. § 35.39(a).
99. Id. § 35.42(a)–(b). The change in status includes a change in affiliation as well as a change
in ownership or control resulting in an increase of 100 MW or more of generation. Id. § 35.42(a)(1).
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of generation in one region; owns, operates, or controls transmission facilities; has market power; or is a franchised public utility. 100 Category 2 applicants undergo greater ratemaking scrutiny and have an increased regulatory
burden, including higher reporting requirements after their status is approved,
because Category 2 applicants, by their nature, are monopolies with market
power within certain power regions. 101
B. The Slippery Slope and Opportunities to Address It Early
When Google Energy sought to become a Category 1 Seller, 102 the only
intervenors were the California Public Utilities Commission, which filed a
motion to intervene four days after the deadline, 103 and Mabuhay Alliance. 104
Mabuhay’s letter is interesting because it mimics some of the concerns discussed in this Article. Specifically, it expressed “concerns about the impact
of the filing on Asian American and other minority communities.” 105 The
letter was written on behalf of five million Asian Americans living in California who worried about future energy rates if Google entered the energy
market. 106 The letter seemed to recognize the potential for a slippery slope, 107
stating that if FERC allowed Google to sell electricity, it may soon “dominate

100. Id. § 35.36(a)(3).
101. See generally Id. § 35.36. Category 2 Sellers have two choices for determining rates. They
can prepare a mitigation proposal for FERC’s approval, or they can rely on a traditional cost-ofservice rate analysis:
Default mitigation for sales of energy or capacity consists of three distinct products: (1)
Sales of power of one week or less priced at the Seller’s incremental cost plus a 10 percent
adder; (2) Sales of power of more than one week but less than one year priced at no higher
than a cost-based ceiling reflecting the costs of the unit(s) expected to provide the service;
and (3) New contracts filed for review under [FPA] [S]ection 205 . . . for sales of power
for one year or more priced at a rate not to exceed embedded cost of service.
Id. § 35.38(b).
102. See Google Energy Order, supra note 71, at 1.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id. at 2 n.5; see Letter from Mabuhay Alliance, Google’s Application to Tap Power Markets and Its Potential Adverse Impact on California’s Ratepayers, No. ER10-468 (FERC Jan. 13,
2010) [hereinafter Letter from Mabuhay Alliance]. FERC disregarded the letter, stating that
Mabuhay Alliance provided “no facts or evidence that Google Energy has market power in Commission-regulated markets.” Google Energy Order, supra note 71, at 2 n.5.
105. Google Energy Order, supra note 71, at 2 n.5; see Letter from Mabuhay Alliance, supra
note 104 and accompanying text.
106. Letter from Mabuhay Alliance, supra note 104, at 1.
107. “This case could be a precedent for other companies breaking away from the energy market
grid in ways that could increase the cost to consumers including the newly unemployed and our
nation’s 25 million small businesses that have no other options than the regulated utility monopoly.”
Id. at 2 (citing Rebecca Smith & Jessica E. Vascellaro, Google Seeks to Tap Power Markets, WALL
ST.
J.
(Jan.
7,
2010),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704854904574644721659940760).

90

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:73

the market in unexpected ways.” 108 FERC found no basis for Mabuhay Alliance’s assertions. 109
Under FERC’s current rule, multinational corporations, like Apple and
Google, are allowed to use market-based rates and given a lot of leeway in
setting customer rates for electricity or energy products, so long as they do
not own or control more than a certain amount of electricity within any given
region. This is called the “horizontal market power rule.” The rule was intended to promote competition and entry into the market by small utilities
and independent power producers. 110 Large utilities holding horizontal market power do not qualify, but instead are subject to more stringent regulation
by FERC to ensure their rates are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory.
While FERC’s market power test may be sufficient to protect customers
from market rates set by small utilities and independent power producers, it
may not be sufficient protection when the entity selling the electricity is a
multinational billion-dollar corporation that already has market power in its
own industry. Safeguarding consumer protections will be key. Mabuhay
Alliance was likely thinking ahead when it protested Google’s entry into the
energy market. 111 FERC disregarded the letter, stating that Mabuhay Alliance provided “no facts or evidence that Google Energy has market power in
Commission-regulated markets.” 112 Instead of focusing on commission-regulated markets, FERC should consider whether the applicant has market
power in any industry, and whether that market power could result in consumer manipulation or an abuse of power.
Large tech companies selling electricity represent a concerning trend—
similar to Amazon’s bid to buy Whole Foods. Amazon started out as an
online bookseller in 1994 and is now one of the world’s largest corporations
dominating the entire online retail market. 113 According to a Reuters report,
“Antitrust experts . . . said the [purchase of Whole Foods] will be approved
108. Id. at 1.
109. Google Energy Order, supra note 71, at 2 n.5.
110. See generally OFFICE OF ECON., ELEC. & NAT. GAS ANALYSIS, DEP’T OF ENERGY,
HORIZONAL MARKET POWER IN RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY MARKETS (2000), http://www.energymarketers.com/Documents/DOE_Horizontal_MP-0308.pdf.
111. See Letter from Mabuhay Alliance, supra note 104, at 2 (“Asian American’s [sic] strongly
favor competition and free markets as long as they are effectively regulated and scrutinized but,
competition should be for the benefit of, not at the expense of, underserved communities or ratepayers. We also believe that many regulated utilities, such as PG&E and Sempra, more effectively
serve our nation’s 15 million Asian American [sic] than most Silicon Valley companies such as
Google. This service includes non-discriminatory contracts with Asian American small businesses,
a wide variety of Asian Americans in all levels of senior management, and investing in the growth
and welfare of underserved Asian American communities including those long ignored by corporate
America such as the Hmong, Laotian, Cambodian and Samoan communities.”).
112. Google Energy Order, supra note 71, at 2 n.5 (emphasis added).
113. Relentless.com, ECONOMIST (June 19, 2014), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2014/06/19/relentlesscom.
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because Amazon sells few groceries and Whole Foods is a minnow in the
grocery market.” 114 But, this is exactly how large corporations leverage
power from one market to enter another, ultimately dominating that industry. 115 Professor Darren Bush, an anti-trust expert, noted that one major concern is the ability of large corporations to discriminate. 116 He pointed to Amazon’s removal of the “buy” button from certain books published by entities
embroiled in legal disputes with the corporation. 117 This type of move from
one large industry to another, especially when that industry is providing a
public good, should at the very least raise consumer protection awareness.
Since the early days of electricity, 118 the United States has maintained
the policy that energy is a “public good.” 119 A public good is a commodity
that individuals may consume but not prevent others from accessing. 120 Classic examples of public goods include: public defense systems, such as police
and fire services, public water, or air. 121 Pure public goods have two primary
characteristics: non-excludability and non-rivalrous consumption. 122 Nonexcludability refers to the prohibition against excluding nonpayers from enjoying the benefits of the good or service. 123 This characteristic leads to the
“free rider problem,” which occurs when a good is made available, and those
who have not paid for it are still able to consume it. 124 Non-rivalrous consumption means consumption by one user of a good does not restrict consumption by others. 125 Because of these two characteristics, public goods
cannot be supplied at a profit and may be abandoned by the private sector. 126
114. Diane Bartz, Critics Say Whole Foods Deal Would Give Amazon an Unfair Advantage,
REUTERS (June 22, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-whole-foods-m-a-amazon-com-antitrust-idUSKBN19D2Q8.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. According to one anonymous former republican antitrust enforcer, “The notion of leveraging your power in market A to enter into market B has . . . been around for a long time as a
basis for enforcement.” Id.
118. The “early days” began in 1882 with Thomas Edison’s Pearl Street station in Manhattan
and the formation of the first electric holding company, Commonwealth Edison, in Chicago, Illinois.
See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 1, at 291.
119. See Christopher A. Simon, Is Energy a Public Good?, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (July
2, 2007), https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2007/07/is-energy-a-public-good49201.html.
120. Rafael Leal-Arcas, Sustainability, Common Concern, and Public Goods, 49 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 801, 807 (2017).
121. See id.; Tyler Cowen, Public Goods, LIBRARY ECON. & LIBERTY,
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicGoods.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
122. Leal-Arcas, supra note 120, at 807.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 807–08.
125. Inge Kaul et al., Defining Global Public Goods, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS:
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999).
126. See Leal-Arcas, supra note 120, at 808.
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As a result, governments typically provide pure public goods, such as a national defense system or traffic lights. 127
Impure public goods may occur when a good or service is not wholly
non-excludable or non-rivalrous. 128 There are two types of impure public
goods: club goods and common pool resources. 129 Club goods encompass
those public goods that are non-rivalrous in consumption but excludable. 130
Common pool resources are those goods that are mostly non-excludable but
rivalrous in consumption. 131
Energy by itself is a pure public good. The law of conservation of energy tells us energy can neither be created nor destroyed. 132 As such, energy
is non-rivalrous in consumption and non-excludable. Electricity, however,
does not readily meet the economic classification of a public good. Unlike
energy, electricity is a secondary system because it is produced from the combustion of primary energy sources: coal, oil, and natural gas. 133 Because of
this distinction, electricity is technically excludable and rivalrous in consumption.
Despite this classification, the United States still treats electricity as a
public good. This treatment may arise from ethics rather than economics.
People in the United States rely on electricity to live their everyday lives, and
it is not hyperbole to state that people would die without it. An alternative
view is that the secure supply of electricity rather than the electricity itself
serves as the public good. 134 For example, the open network of transmission
lines used to transport electricity from the generator to the consumer are nonexcludable and non-rivalrous in consumption. Because electricity is fungible, it is impossible to exclude people from only consuming electricity not
transported via transmission line. As a result, the secure supply of electricity
provided by transmission lines is non-excludable. In addition, because use

127. Id. at 807–08.
128. See Kaul et al., supra note 125, at 4. Because impure public goods are far more common
than pure public goods, the former is generally included when discussing the latter. Id.
129. Id. at 5.
130. See id. at 5. Cable TV is an example of a club good because people may be excluded from
consuming it, but, at the same time, consumption of Cable TV does not deplete it as a resource.
Leal-Arcas, supra note 120, at 807.
131. Kaul et al., supra note 125, at 5. Examples of common pool resources include forests,
fisheries, and wildlife. Leal-Arcas, supra note 120, at 807. People technically cannot be excluded
from consuming these resources, but there is a finite amount of each and consumption will lead to
depletion of the resource. Id.
132. See Clara Moskowitz, Fact or Fiction?: Energy Can Neither Be Created Nor Destroyed,
SCI. AM. (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/energy-can-neither-be-created-nor-destroyed/.
133. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 1, at 285.
134. See generally Malcolm Abbott, Is the Security of Electricity Supply a Public Good?, 14
ELECTRICITY J. 31, 32 (2001).

2018]

1-CLICK ENERGY

93

of the transmission lines once they are built does not deplete their ability to
provide electricity, the security they provide is also non-rivalrous.
Regardless of the reason for its treatment as a public good, electricity—
particularly the wholesale electricity market—is vulnerable to abuse because
of the tendency of electric utilities to form natural monopolies. “A natural
monopoly exists when a single firm can produce a desired level of output at
lower total cost than any output combination of more than one firm.” 135 Electric utilities benefit from economies of scale, meaning that average cost of
generating and transmitting electricity falls as the volume of consumers increases. 136 Once the infrastructure is built, it is far cheaper for a single utility
company to provide electricity to a new customer than it is for a new utility
to build its own infrastructure and then provide service. 137 Due to these qualities, electric utilities were initially vertically integrated, allowing a single
company to monopolize the market and requiring greater regulation. 138
The slippery slope concern emerges when the tech companies are allowed to leverage their market power from the information technology industry—with their ability to touch and control millions of customers—to now
provide a common good such as electricity. Several news articles discuss
this concern, 139 with the majority predicting that Apple will be able to sell
electricity directly to end users, thereby replacing the traditional utility company. 140 While this is something to keep an eye on, under current regulations,
Apple is only allowed to consume the power itself or to sell it at wholesale.
Another option, however, is more intriguing. One author wrote, “Apple
could sell clean energy to households, powering iPhones and perhaps electric
vehicles with 100% renewable energy.” 141 Again, the existing legal structure

135. Douglas Gegax & Kenneth Nowotny, Competition and the Electric Utility Industry: An
Evaluation, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 63, 67 (1993).
136. Economies of Scale and Scope, ECONOMIST (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/12446567.
137. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 1, at 308–12.
138. Id. at 308–09.
139. Lauren Hepler, Why Apple’s New Energy Business Should Scare Utilities, GREENBIZ (June
14, 2016, 2:10 AM), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/why-apples-new-energy-business-shouldscare-utilities.
140. See e.g., Healy, supra note 47 (“Apple is seeking the ability to sell the renewable energy it
generates to other businesses and consumers at retail prices.”); Travis Hoium, How Apple’s
HomeKit Could Revolutionize Energy, MOTLEY FOOL (Aug. 17, 2016, 8:07 AM),
https://www.fool.com/investing/2016/08/17/how-apples-homekit-could-revolutionize-energy.aspx
(“The company already . . . has a payment system and millions of consumers’ financial data on file,
and it has the platform to control assets as well. Apple could become the power company of the
future, if it wanted to.”); Seth Weintraub, Apple Has Just Become an Energy Company, Looks to
Sell Excess Electricity into the Grid and Maybe More, 9TO5MAC (June 9, 2016, 8:18 AM),
https://9to5mac.com/2016/06/09/apple-energy-company/ (“What Apple seemingly could . . . do,
however, is sell directly to end-users at market rates.”).
141. Healy, supra note 47.
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does not allow Apple to sell electricity to households via transmission infrastructure because that would result in a retail sale that Apple would need to
be licensed as a state public utility to make. Apple could, however, use its
renewable energy facilities to charge batteries that could be sold to households to power their homes, iPhones, and electric cars. 142
We have seen examples of companies abusing their power when left
unregulated before (for example, Enron). 143 This abuse of power generally
arises in one of three scenarios: (1) price-gouging, (2) undercutting, and (3)
affiliate preference. Price-gouging occurs when a seller spikes prices to a
level above what is reasonable. 144 In this scenario, the corporate wholesale
energy seller raises prices, resulting in increased retail costs that are passed
down to the end consumer.
Undercutting occurs when the seller offers energy at a price lower than
what other companies could sell it at. 145 Undercutting prices drives out competition and allows the seller to increase its prices once the competition has
been defeated. Given the market power of multinational corporations, they
would be able to absorb costs of selling electricity at a price lower than their
competitors. They have strong alternative markets and would survive the
lower prices, while their competition would likely fail.
In Nebbia v. New York, 146 the Supreme Court identified one example of
the perils of undercutting. 147 In this popular constitutional law case, the Court
upheld a fixed price for milk set by New York’s Milk Control Board. 148 The
Court’s reasoning rested on the need for expensive safeguards in the handling
142. “Though Apple declined to elaborate on any broader strategic significance for the new
energy subsidiary, the company has long been rumored to be interested in electric cars.” Hepler,
supra note 139. “Reuters recently reported that Apple had shown interest in charging station technology for electric vehicles . . . .” Travis Hoium, Apple Energy: Is This Apple’s Next Billion Dollar
Business?, MOTLEY FOOL (June 18, 2016, 8:06 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2016/06/18/apple-energy-is-this-apples-next-billion-dollar-bu.aspx.
Apple also launched
HomeKit, which is an application program interface that allows all household electronics, such as
lights, locks, thermostats, security, doors, fans, outlets, and air conditioners, to speak to each other
and be controlled remotely from the Home app. Your Home at Your Command, APPLE,
http://www.apple.com/ios/home/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
143. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Four (or Five) Easy Lessons from
Enron, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1787 (2002); Christopher M. Iaquinto, A Silent Spring in Deep Water?:
Proposing Front-End Regulation of Dispersants After the Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 39 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 419 (2012).
144. See John Spacey, What Is Price Gouging?, SIMPLICABLE (Sept. 21, 2016), https://simplicable.com/new/price-gouging.
145. See Chad Finkelstein, Setting the Price of Your Product Across All Franchises Is No
Longer a Criminal Offence, FIN. POST (Aug. 4, 2015) https://business.financialpost.com/entrepreneur/franchise-focus/setting-the-price-of-your-product-across-all-franchises-is-no-longer-a-criminal-offence.
146. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
147. See generally id.
148. Id. at 520–21.

2018]

1-CLICK ENERGY

95

and production of milk to protect it from contamination. 149 If there were no
fixed price, milk producers could undercut each other by using less safeguards to achieve a lower price and, therefore, higher sales. 150 Just as in
Nebbia, Apple or Amazon could undercut other wholesale electricity companies in order to increase sales.
Finally, multinational corporations could abuse their power by forcing
consumers to subsidize energy for their affiliates. The entities could allow
affiliates to purchase wholesale energy at a price below market value and
charge non-affiliates a higher price in order to make up the difference. This
same tactic was used by John D. Rockefeller and the railroads to subsidize
shipping costs for oil. Railroads charged Rockefeller a lower price and forced
other oil producers to pay a higher price in response. 151
FERC could potentially address the unregulated power of multinational
corporations by redefining market power to include market power in any industry, regardless of whether it is a FERC-regulated industry. FERC has the
exclusive authority to regulate wholesale sales of electricity and an obligation
to ensure customers are protected from manipulation. It may establish whatever rule is appropriate in order to carry out its statutory directives. In doing
so, FERC should consider all relevant factors, such as whether the applicant
holds market power in another industry that could allow it to manipulate the
energy industry and its consumers.
The United States has historically sought to mitigate potential abuse of
monopolist power through both regulation and fostering competition within
the wholesale electricity market. Alongside this action has been the public
policy of protecting consumer access to electricity, which is evident in both
judicial and legislative history. The judiciary has long identified energy as a
valid public use for purposes of eminent domain. 152 Likewise, Congress
stepped in early to protect consumers from corporate abuse in the electricity
industry with the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935
(“PUHCA”). 153 The PUHCA was enacted when only three massive holding
companies controlled nearly half the utilities in the United States. 154 This
pyramid scheme allowed holding companies to inflate and hide actual costs
149. Id. at 516–17.
150. Id.
151. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, & POWER 21–23 (2009).
152. United States v. 14.02 Acres of Land More or Less in Fresno Cty., 547 F.3d 943, 952 (9th
Cir. 2008).
153. Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (repealed 2005). For an interesting historical discussion of the PUHCA, see A. C. Pritchard & Richard B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New
Deal Justices, 95 VA. L. REV. 841, 862–68 (2009).
154. Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 153, at 847; Public Utility Holding Company Act
(PUHCA), UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energy-solutions/strengthen-policy/public-utility-holding.html#.W92y6S2ZMW9 (last visited Nov. 3,
2018).
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of service charged by unregulated affiliates, pass those costs down to the utility, and to the end customer thereafter. 155 Many argue this pyramid scheme
led to the great Wall Street Crash of 1929.156 The PUHCA prohibited nonutility owners (like oil companies) to own utilities and required the Securities
and Exchange Commission to approve any utility merger or acquisition by a
holding company. 157 The PUHCA also required holding companies to incorporate in the state where the utility operated, so the state could regulate the
utility. 158 Congress’s protection continued over the years, but in 2005 it repealed and replaced PUHCA with the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 159
Further, FERC previously noted the need to be adaptive to changing
realities in the energy industry. For example, in 1996, FERC issued Order
888 that required utilities to provide open access to transmission facilities. 160
This order lessened the economies of scale, 161 which enabled electricity utilities to form natural monopolies. In any event, Congress tasked FERC with
regulating wholesale electricity sales to ensure fair prices for consumers and
returns on investment for utility shareholders. 162
Generally, “[a]n agency has no obligation to gather or consider . . . information if it has no statutory authority to act on that information.” 163 And
if an agency bases a decision on that information, “which Congress has not
intended it to consider,” it can be found to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 164 FERC’s authority to regulate entities engaged in the wholesale
generation of energy is absolute, however, and not limited in the factors that
it may consider. 165 This is similar to its absolute congressional power to include all relevant factors when issuing permits for natural gas pipelines,
which was recently at issue in Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (Southeast Market Pipelines Project). 166

155. See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 1, at 291–92.
156. Pritchard & Thompson, supra note 153, at 842.
157. Public Utility Holding Company Act § 10.
158. Id.
159. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). Under the Act, non-utility owned holding companies are once again allowed to own utility companies, and they are not limited to any one geographical area. Id. Mergers and acquisitions are still regulated, however, but FERC is now in charge
of administering the process instead of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Id.
160. See FERC Order 888, supra note 92.
161. See Economies of Scale and Scope, supra note 136 (discussing the economies of scale
whereby a company can reduce its per unit costs by increasing production volume).
162. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012); DAVIES ET AL., supra note 1, at 311.
163. Southeast Market Pipelines Project, 867 F.3d 1357, 1372–73 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing Dep’t
of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767–68 (2004)).
164. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
165. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a).
166. 867 F.3d 1357, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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In Southeast Market Pipelines Project, the Sierra Club brought suit
against FERC, alleging it failed to adequately consider the climate and community impacts of a proposed natural gas pipeline project running through
Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. 167 Environmental groups were concerned
that the project would increase fossil fuel emissions that contribute to climate
change, landowners did not want their land taken for a pipeline, and underprivileged communities were concerned that the pipeline project would be
constructed in neighborhoods already significantly burdened by pollution
from industry. 168 Under the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 169 applicants wishing
to construct a natural gas pipeline must first obtain approval from FERC—in
the form of a certificate of public convenience and necessity. 170 Prior to issuing the certificate, FERC is obligated to prepare an environmental impact
statement (“EIS”) for actions “significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.” 171 FERC did so and ultimately approved the pipeline’s certificate without consideration of the climate and community impacts.172
With regard to the climate impact, the pipelines relied on an earlier set
of cases 173 and argued that FERC had no obligation to look at these issues
because it had no “legal power to prevent” the negative effect.174 The court
disagreed and distinguished the cases. In Sierra Club v. FERC (Freeport), 175
the court held that FERC had no legal authority to consider the climate impacts of liquefied natural gas (“LNG”) exports when issuing an upgrade license and, therefore, was not obligated to include a climate assessment within
the EIS. 176 In the case at hand, the court distinguished Freeport by pointing
out that FERC’s authority to issue permits in LNG matters is not congressional. Its authority derives from a “narrow delegation from the Department
of Energy.” 177 As a result, FERC is limited to the specific language of the
delegated authority for LNG permits. 178 It is not limited, however, when

167. Id. at 1363, 1365.
168. Id. at 1364.
169. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717w (2012).
170. See id. § 717f.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012).
172. Southeast Market Pipelines Project, 867 F.3d at 1364–65.
173. See Sierra Club v. FERC (Freeport), 827 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Sierra Club v. FERC
(Sabine Pass), 827 F.3d 59 (D.C. Cir. 2016); EarthReports, Inc. v. FERC, 828 F.3d 949 (D.C. Cir.
2016).
174. Southeast Market Pipelines Project, 867 F.3d at 1383 (emphasis added).
175. 827 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
176. Id. at 47.
177. Southeast Market Pipelines Project, 867 F.3d at 1373.
178. Id.
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Congress so broadly construed its authority as it did under the Natural Gas
Act 179 or, here, under the Federal Power Act. 180
FERC’s exclusive authority to regulate entities engaged in the wholesale generation of energy is an absolute right under the Federal Power Act. 181
It has the authority and the obligation to evaluate the market power of its
applicants, regardless of whether that market power is within a commissionregulated market, if that market power has the potential to negatively impact
millions of customers. Once again, FERC must adjust to changing times and
redefine its market power definition to include market power in any industry,
regardless of whether it is a FERC-regulated industry.
FERC historically adapted to changing realities in the energy industry,
and it can do so again. 182 FERC is obligated under the Federal Power Act to
protect the public from unreasonable rates and discriminatory practices. 183 It
should now take a more proactive role in regulating energy sales by multinational companies that have the ability to reach millions with one click. 184
IV. THE CURRENT RETAIL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IS NOT NIMBLE
ENOUGH TO MEET CORPORATE DEMAND FOR CLEAN ENERGY
Another issue to address early is the corporate demand for, and corporate development of, clean energy and its stress on the current utility structure. As previously noted, most corporate businesses do not want to become

179. Id.
180. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a–828cr (2012).
181. Id. § 824(a).
182. See Erich D. Priebe, Demand Response and Order 745: Market-Based Reforms in Energy
Regulation, 39 J. CORP. L. 617, 625 (2014) (“Although FERC has certain statutory obligations to
oversee the electricity market and generally protect the public interest, the scope of these obligations, in practical terms, is not static, and FERC has adapted its approach to ratemaking to accommodate shifts in the electricity market.”).
183. See James W. Moeller, Toward an SEC-FERC Memorandum of Understanding, 15
ENERGY L.J. 31, 36 (1994) (“The [Federal Power Act] prohibits discrimination in electric power
rates and charges as well as unreasonable differences in rates and charges between different classes
of electric power service.”).
184. See About 1-Click Ordering, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=468482 (last visited Sept. 29, 2018) (“1-Click ordering places your order automatically and lets you skip the shopping cart.”). Until September 2017, Amazon held the patent for
one-click shopping, licensing the technology to companies like Apple, who used it in their iOS app
store for app purchases. Amazon’s Patent on One-Click Payments to Expire, BUS. INSIDER
INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/amazons-patent-on-one-click-payments-to-expire-2017-1. The loss of this patent could open the door for companies like Google and
other tech companies to institute their own one-click payment systems. In fact, one-click shopping
has become so integral to online shopping that the World Wide Web Consortium works with major
tech companies to set standards for adding payment credentials to web browsers to enable one-click
payments for all purchases. Id.
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energy providers, but “the lack of responsiveness from utilities in some regions has forced them to do exactly this.” 185 This lack of responsiveness to
supply the clean energy in demand could very well result in significant lost
profits, stranded costs for the utilities, and an increase in utility costs for remaining customers. This Part looks at potential implications for incumbent
utilities due to existing state regulatory schemes 186 and considers opportunities for higher levels of collaboration for public-private development of clean
energy. 187
A. State Authority Over (Retail) Utility Planning
Most public utilities are regulated by state public utility commissions
that set prices for retail customer rates and regulate utility capital expenditure
decisions through prudency-type hearings. 188 Most states include some level
of integrated resource planning (“IRP”). 189 IRP requirements came into play
in the late 1980s as states were looking for ways to respond to nuclear development failures and the oil embargo. 190
These state requirements can vary widely, with most requiring utilities
to consider long-term, least-cost, and lowest-risk methods for addressing (1)
customer growth, (2) demand, (3) generation capability, and (4) availability
of emergency backup if a plant fails.191 IRP standards tend to require utilities
to have a holistic view of how demand can be met, and they do not generally
focus on specific customers, such as corporate customers, demanding a specific type of energy. 192
185. RE100, supra note 15, at 7.
186. See infra Section IV.A.
187. See infra Section IV.B.
188. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309 (1989) (generally discussing state
prudency hearings and stating: “Under the ‘prudent investment’ [or ‘historical cost’ rule], a utility
is compensated for all prudent investments at their actual cost when made (their ‘historical’ cost),
irrespective of whether individual investments are deemed necessary or beneficial in hindsight.”).
189. See RACHEL WILSON & PAUL PETERSON, SYNAPSE ENERGY ECONS., INC., A BRIEF
SURVEY OF STATE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING RULES AND REQUIREMENTS 16 (2011),
http://www.cleanskies.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/ACSF_IRP-Survey_Final_2011-04-28.pdf
(“Although 39 of 50 states have a rule or requirement for long-term resource planning or procurement, the variations between the state rules are substantial. In traditional IRP states, the general
requirements are similar, but differences between scope, longevity, renewal, and other requirements
are still significant. For states with only procurement rules, some of the benefits of an ‘integrated’
planning process and document are lost. For this reason, there has been a call to return to integrated
resource planning in some of the states that have restructured.”).
190. RACHEL WILSON & BRUCE BIEWALD, SYNAPSE ENERGY ECONS., INC., BEST PRACTICES
IN ELECTRIC UTILITY INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING 3 (2013), http://www.raponline.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/rapsynapse-wilsonbiewald-bestpracticesinirp-2013-jun-21.pdf.
191. See WILSON & PETERSON, supra note 189, at 3; Lincoln L. Davies & Victoria Luman,
Incomplete Integration: Water, Drought, and Electricity Planning in the West, 31 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 167, 190–91 (2016).
192. Davies & Luman, supra note 191, at 192.
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As such, most energy customers historically had little involvement in
generation planning. Instead, state public utility commissions required utilities to make prudency determinations as to how much energy was needed and
to forecast future energy demand. 193 Traditionally, prudency reviews did not
involve what type of energy to develop, other than as it related to projected
cost. If utilities could generate enough power to cover their current and anticipated customer load, it was simply not prudent to develop more (clean)
energy facilities dedicated to specific customers. Further, in the mid-1990s,
many states “repealed or ignored” their IRP standards due in part to restructuring in the electricity industry. 194
More recently, there is a movement to make the process more robust so
as to include a better vision for a clean energy future. 195 This was propelled
forward in the 1980s, when states began adopting renewable energy portfolios that required utilities to generate a certain amount of their energy from
renewable sources. 196 At that point, prudency determinations required utilities to supply a certain amount of renewable energy. However, most utilities
met this requirement by adding new renewables to meet new demand. The
renewable energy was placed into the grid and co-mingled with energy generated from fossil fuel sources.
Now, utilities are asked to supply certain energy from certain resources
for certain customers with the end consumer requesting energy from a specific renewable resource. With these specific demands, it makes sense utilities involve large customers in the early decision-making process, incentivizing large customers to remain with the utility via green tariffs or something
similar 197 instead of seeking out independent power producers or generating
their own energy.
Unfortunately, most utilities are not proactive in this regard, 198 possibly
because it is not that simple. Utilities already have installed generation from

193. WILSON & BIEWALD, supra note 190, at 3.
194. Id. (“As the electric industry began to restructure in the mid-1990s, integrated resource
planning rules in many states were repealed or ignored. Some states have since made an effort to
update IRP rules to make them applicable to current industry conditions, while other states have
continued to use rules that are now out of date.”).
195. See James M. Van Nostrand, An Energy and Sustainability Roadmap for West Virginia,
115 W. VA. L. REV. 879, 885–92 (2013) (discussing the need for West Virginia to require more
rigorous long-term planning initiatives in their regulatory policies).
196. See Renewable Energy Standards, SEIA, https://www.seia.org/initiatives/renewable-energy-standards (last visited Aug. 26, 2018).
197. WORLD WILDLIFE FOUND. ET AL., supra note 15, at 4, 9. A green tariff allows customers
to choose renewable energy through a portfolio of utility-owned renewables or via contract with
independent power producers. See Teresa A. Hill & William H. Holmes, Corporate Energy Sourcing: A New Engine for Renewables, LAW360 (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/719556/corporate-energy-sourcing-a-new-engine-for-renewables.
198. WORLD WILDLIFE FOUND. ET AL., supra note 15, at 4.
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fossil fuel sources. Assuming no increase in demand, adding renewable energy specifically for one large customer (basically fuel switching for one customer) would result in an overage in energy generation. The utility would
need to shut down or limit the use of power generated from a fossil fuel power
plant and curtail output, which would result in a large stranded cost to the
utility and increased costs for existing utility customers. 199
Microsoft provides a recent example of regulatory requirements falling
drastically behind consumer demand. Microsoft currently plans to shift 80%
of its power in the Pacific Northwest away from the vertically integrated utility, Puget Sound Energy, to seek other options, such as PPAs with independent power producers who can provide greater renewable energy generation. 200 In April 2017, Microsoft and Puget Sound Energy entered into a
special contract settlement that requires Microsoft to pay $23.6 million in
transition fees to offset the utility’s lost profits and stranded costs. 201 Microsoft has historically been the utility’s largest customer; however, Puget
Sound Energy was unable to meet Microsoft’s growing demand for renewable energy with 60% of its electricity generation from fossil fuels.202 Puget
Sound Energy’s 40% renewable energy generation is significantly above
Washington State’s renewable portfolio requirements of 15% by 2020. 203

199. The question of how state utility commissions should address stranded costs due to clean
energy and how those costs should be assessed is outside the scope of this Article. Should the
customer demanding renewable energy be required to pay for a portion of the transition cost like
the Microsoft Special Contract? Or, should all utility customers absorb the loss because it is for a
common good? Those are topics for another day.
200. Hal Bernton, In Quest for Clean Power, Microsoft Wants to Bypass Puget Sound Energy
Under New Deal, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/microsoft-pse-reach-agreement-on-greener-energy/.
201. Settlement Filed in Microsoft-PSE Energy Purchasing Proposal, WASH. UTIL. & TRANSP.
COMM’N
(Apr.
12,
2017),
https://www.utc.wa.gov/aboutUs/Lists/News/DispForm.aspx?ID=441&Source=https%3A%2F%2
Fwww%2Eutc%2Ewa%2Egov%2FaboutUs%2FLists%2FNews%2FAllItems%2Easpx&ContentTypeId=0x010400FF58A04FBD57384DB60A5ECF52665206. As more businesses leave the
grid, the impact to utility companies is noteworthy. For example, MGM Resorts recently announced
it will pay $90 million to leave the grid in Nevada so that it can buy power from third party power
producers. Travis Hoium, Why Corporate America’s Love of Renewable Energy Should Terrify
Traditional Utilities, MOTLEY FOOL (June 5, 2016, 9:07 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2016/06/05/why-corporate-americas-love-of-renewable-energy-sh.aspx (“Companies are looking at renewable energy as a way to save costs, lock in rates, and go green, and they may have more
power to upset the utility business model than even a million homeowners installing solar panels.”).
202. Bernton, supra note 200.
203. Renewable Energy Standard, DSIRE, http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/2350 (last updated Nov. 19, 2015).
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B. Opportunities for Public-Private Collaboration
This leads us to opportunities for collaboration and public-private partnerships for clean energy. Perceiving these demand gaps, several collaborations emerged over the last few years to help private businesses meet their
renewable energy goals, in part by engaging utilities and raising awareness
of the problem.
For example, RE100 partnered with the Business Renewables Center,
which was founded by the Rocky Mountain Institute. 204 The purpose of the
Business Renewables Center is to provide the tools to connect renewable demand with energy providers. 205 PPAs appear to be the main priority, as the
collaboration sees PPAs as “a fast and effective way for large companies to
fulfill their sustainability targets.” 206 The Business Renewables Center’s goal
is to procure 60 GW of off-site renewable energy for member companies by
2030. 207 It proposes to do so by providing the following tools:
• A communications platform to raise awareness and champion successes and opportunities;
• A community of leading thinkers and industry practitioners, who actively participate in identifying hurdles and solutions to market growth; and
• A knowledge base of known obstacles and proven solutions, and software tools to facilitate transactions. 208
Another collaboration is the Renewable Energy Buyers Alliance
(“REBA”), which is led by the World Wildlife Fund and the World Resources Institute. 209 REBA is a collaboration of sixty-five companies, “representing over 54 million [MWh] of annual demand by 2020.” 210 The collaboration seeks to identify easier paths for access to renewable energy, 211
with a goal to raise awareness of the renewable energy shortage and provide
204. RE100, supra note 15, at 10. The Rocky Mountain Institute was organized by the Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation to address “relevant legal developments and issues.” About the
Foundation, ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUND., https://www.rmmlf.org/about/about-thefoundation (last visited Sept 26, 2018). The Foundation is a “collaborative, educational, non-profit
organization dedicated to the scholarly and practical study of the laws and regulations relating to
mining, oil and gas, energy, public lands, water, environmental and international law.” Id.
205. RE100, supra note 15, at 10.
206. What We Do, BUS. RENEWABLES CTR., http://www.businessrenewables.org/what-we-do/
(last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
207. BRC: Business Renewables Center, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST., http://www.rmi.org/business_renewables_center (last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
208. Id.
209. RE100, supra note 15, at 10.
210. About Us, CORP. RENEWABLE ENERGY BUYERS’ PRINCIPLES, http://buyersprinciples.org/about-us/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
211. CORP. RENEWABLE ENERGY BUYERS’ PRINCIPLES, http://buyersprinciples.org/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
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utilities with the tools to address it.212 For example, utilities and corporations,
particularly tech companies, need to have robust and early conversations to
incorporate more technological advances into the system and provide more
opportunities for clean energy investment. 213 REBA tries to connect large
energy customers with utilities by relying on the following Corporate Renewable Energy Buyers’ Principles:
• Greater choice in procurement options . . . [;]
• More access to cost competitive options . . . [;]
• Longer- and variable-term contracts . . . [;]
• Access to new projects that reduce emissions beyond business as usual . . . [;]
• Increased access to third-party financing vehicles 214 as
well as standardized and simplified processes, contracts,
and financing for renewable energy projects . . . [; and]
• Opportunities to work with utilities and regulators to expand our choices for buying renewable energy . . . . 215
These collaboration efforts need to occur early and focus on customer
trends—like corporate demand for renewable energy. However, collaboration efforts will have little benefit if states do not have integrated resource
planning requirements that value the above principles. For example, the
least-cost and lowest-risk method for addressing long-term customer growth
and demand should include a discussion about the possibility of major corporate customers leaving the system if utilities are unable to provide clean
energy. 216 If Microsoft pays $23.6 million in transition fees just to leave the
system, how much would it be willing to pay for clean, reliable, renewable
energy? 217 Maybe the least-cost, lowest-risk, long-term option is shutting
212. RE100, supra note 15, at 10.
213. Priya Barua, Beyond the Monthly Bill: 4 Ways to Achieve Renewables Goals, GREENBIZ
(Sept. 14, 2017, 12:35 AM), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/beyond-monthly-bill-4-waysachieve-renewables-goals; Letha Tawney et al., 5 Emerging Trends for Corporate Buyers of Renewable Energy, WORLD RES. INST. (Sept. 29, 2017), http://www.wri.org/blog/2017/09/5-emerging-trends-corporate-buyers-renewable-energy.
214. Resources are available to aid the formation of such partnerships. For example, the World
Bank’s Public-Private-Partnership in Infrastructure Resource Center offers help with the energy
sector world-wide. Their website is a good source for sample laws and regulations, sample energy
agreements, and information on Clean Technology public-private partnerships. Legal Issues on
Energy and Power PPPs, PUB.-PRIVATE-P’SHIP LEGAL RES. CTR., http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/sector/energy (last updated July 25, 2016).
215. The Principles, CORP. RENEWABLE ENERGY BUYERS’ PRINCIPLES, http://buyersprinciples.org/principles/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
216. WILSON & BIEWALD, supra note 190, at 3; Davies & Luman, supra note 191, at 190–91.
217. Microsoft worked with the Wyoming utility, Black Hills Energy, to collaboratively design
a new tariff for its data center in Cheyenne, Wyoming. Herman K. Trabish, How Microsoft and a
Wyoming Utility Designed a Data Center Tariff that Works for Everyone, UTILITYDIVE (Dec. 20,
2016), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/how-microsoft-and-a-wyoming-utility-designed-a-data-

104

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:73

down fossil fuel plants and building renewable energy plants to satisfy the
growing customer demand for clean electricity.
V. CONCLUSION
Globally, there is a significant increase in corporate demand for clean
energy. This demand for clean energy could very well be the catalyst the
industry needs to push it beyond fossil fuels. Unfortunately, public utility
companies are not as nimble as private corporations would like them to be,
and they are unable to respond to this increased demand. As a result, we are
seeing multinational companies, like Apple and Google, generate their own
energy or enter the energy market themselves. This shift could have a significant, negative impact on the existing energy delivery system. Both federal and state utility commissions need to reconsider their regulatory framework. FERC needs to reevaluate its market power rule to determine whether
it is sufficient to protect electricity consumers. State utility commissions
need to reevaluate their integrative resource planning requirements to ensure
utilities are not bootstrapped into keeping fossil fuels on the system instead
of meeting corporate demand for clean power. Large multinationals have the
means and motive to offer their products through an environmentally
friendly, clean-energy manner. This is the future with customers, shareholders, and investors demanding no less. The goal, however, is to do so in a way
that (1) protects the end consumer from unreasonable costs either associated
with market manipulation or utility lost profits and (2) creates a more collaborative and thoughtful planning process for incorporation of clean energy.

center-tariff-that-work/430807/. The Public Service Commission of Wyoming, Large Power Contract Service approved a rate that will save Microsoft money and will not be detrimental to other
ratepayers. Id. The approved tariff is not a renewable energy tariff but could provide a template
for a future such rate agreement. Id. The agreement gives Black Hills Energy access to Microsoft’s
onsite backup generation to meet peak demand needs and allows the utility to purchase power from
the market on behalf of Microsoft at a firm price. Id. The tariff is open to any Black Hills retail
customer with a load over 13 MW that can deliver similar generation. Id. The tariff shows the
potential for the aggregation of renewable buyers who are too small to own an entire utility-scale
installation. Id. Microsoft hopes that in the future utilities will lean on customer-sited resources
such as their back-up generation. Id.

